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In my:.study of the events culminating in the resignation of Sherman 
Adams from the position of Assistant to the President in 1958, I have 
endeavored to deal with three factors: the Adams-Goldfine relationship 
s~udied by the Congressional committee, the politicians' reaction to the 
information disclosed there, and the position taken b.Y national publi-
cations. I:have-·included a brief statement of Adams 1 earl;y- life and his 
duties as Assistant to the President for backgroun~,purposes, but other-
wise, I have brought in material about the man himself or the !!;isenhower 
administration only as it relates to the case. 
Adams r contacts with the FTC and the SEC w·ere not the only uhes whli.:ch 
came to light in the SUil'll!J3r of 1958, but these calls made in Goldfine 1 s 
behalf attracted the attention of press and politicians, and these are 1tl!e 
ones I·;Ji4'Ve::.d.~alt ldth •. :. ,y., In the long run, the other oontacts had 
little or no effect on the Governor's* career. 
Because of the limited amount of space and time available, I refrained 
from co~aring the Adams affair with the problmms of some of President 
Trwnan 1s staff members. Si.Illilarities do exist, and it is not to be inferr~d 
from the omission of these from my paper that I consider the Adams case 
unique. 
In writing the bibliography, I found no entirely satisfactory wq of 
listing the periodicals. Consequently, for the sake of simplicity and clarity, 
I chose to list the volumes in which articles cited appeared, and in the 
cases of magazines not having volume rnimbers, the approximate dates of the 
material used. 
* The title became a nickname for Adams which lasted throughout 
his service as A@tti.stant to the President. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction: Adams 1 Early Life and Political Career 
Sherman Adams, who was to become one of the most controversial figures 
in the politics of the 1950(s, was born January ! 1 1899, in East Dover, 
Vermont.1 A member of the }iassachusetts .Adams family, he served in the 
United States Marines during World War I and graduated from Dartmouth College 
in 1920.2 After receiving his college~.degree, the young man moved from 
Providence, Rhode Island, where he had spent his childhood, to New Hanpshire.3 
H~ entered the lumber business, and held the office of Treasurer of the 
Black River Lumber Company in Heald ville, Vermont from 1921 to 1923, when 
he received a promotion to woods superintendent of Parker-Young Company in 
Lincoln, New Hampshire. 4 Thus, in his youth and business career, Adams 
developed cozmections id th several states, and in this way gained the out-
look of a Nel-l Englander. 
Parker•Young Company, attempting to strengthen its business through 
political representation, persuaded Adams to enter politics in 1940. 5 
He campaigned successfully for election to the New Hanpshire House of Repre-
sentatives in that year and for reelection in 1942.6 During his second 
term, the~~presentative held the position of Speaker of the House.7 He 
was also active as Chairman of the Republican Committee of Grafton County 
in 1942, and as a delegate to the Republican National Convention in 1944,8 
establishing himself as a leader in New Hampshirepp.at:t:y:_.politicsaa.s:;well::J as 
a trusted spokesman for the people of his area. 
Having gained experience by holding state office, Adams entered national 
poll tics in 19l{!l.9 Elected as Congressman from New Hampshire 1 s second 
district, the freslunan legislator, along with t.hir;W other young Republicans, 
signed a statement declaring that he would follow his own convictions 
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regardless of the position of the conservative Republican leaders.10 l'his 
declaration, made ~ly in his involvement 'i'lith the party outside New 
Hampshire, showed not ohly that Adams intended to follow a course indepen-
dent of do:m:ination by oj;heD politicians, but also the hostility he felt 
for the more 11right-wing11 members of his own party. 
The only setback which Adams ever expenenced at the polls came in 
1946, when he lost the Republican nomination for Governor of New Hampshire 
to the incumbent Charles H. Dale by 157 votes.11 After a two year retirement 
from public life, during which he returned to the lwnber industry, he sought 
and won the governoDship in 1948! 2 This two year term saw the reorganization 
of the state government, producing a reduction of the number of depart-
ments in the state from eighty-three to forty-three at an annual saving 
of about one million dollars.13 This achievement played a major role in the· 
reelection of the Governor in 1950.14 
Turning his attention to business in his second term, Governor Adams 
set up the New Hampshire Business Development 6orporation composed of the 
industrial leaders of the state.15 By the use of public funds, this organi-
sation sought to aid existing businesses in New Hampshire and to encourage 
the establishment of new ones.16 
When the Republican party began U.s searcbffora.appre:Sidentialcc.andidate 
for the 1952 election, Adams' impressive record as Governor gave weight 
to the opinions he voiced. He was one of the siX delegates to the tlovernors 1 
Conference in Gatlinburg, Tennessee to endorse Dwight ~. Eisenhower for the 
. 
Presidency on September 30, 1951.17 This was the beginning of his active 
support of the EisenhoWer-for-President movement. 
On December 17, 1951, Adams l-~\'tt a letter to Senator Henry Cabot 
Lodge telling him that a movement existed in NevT Hampshire~ place 
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Eisenhower's name in the Republican presidential pr1mar,y.18 ImplYing that 
he himself was working toward this end, Adams informed ~dge that he needed 
a definite statement of the Gene raJ. 1 s political affiliation in order to 
satisfy the provisions of New Hampshire law.! 9 . The question arose because 
Eisenhower's political preferences were virtu~ unknown, and the county 
clerk of Dickinson County, Kansas, the war hero 1 s home, had stated in response 
, 
to a letter from the New Hampshire Attorney General in December, 1951, that 
the General had never voted in the county.20 
In a reply to Adams on January 4, 1952, ~dge stated that Eisenhower 
had told him in a conversation which took place while the General was 
President of Columbia University, that Republicanism was a tradition in his 
family, and that he was, in fact, a Republican. 21 General Lucius B. Clay 
also had informed Lodge that the \-lorld War II hero had voted Republican 
since he had left active military service in 1948.22 
Seeing from~ietter that New Hampshire Republicans were enthusiastic 
about the candidacy of Eisenhower, ~dge announced-:P.n January &.,~. 1952, that 
he intended to enter Eisenhower 1 s name in the New Hanpshire Republican primary. 23 
Lodge had not asked the candidate 1 s consent before he made the move, but 
Eisenhower 
once the Senator had made the announcement,A- felt compelled to allow his 
name to appear on t~ballot in the primary. 24 Although Lodge, not Adams, 
actually placed EisenhoWer 1s name in this first primar,y which would eventually 
lead to nomination and election to the presidenqy, the New Hampshire Governor 
was a key figure. His letter indicated to Lodge that Eisenhower would 
have the support of the state's recently reelected\~hief ~ecutive, and this 
Lodge 
must have encouragedl\to proceed with placing the W1IDlm in nomination. 
Apparently Eisenhower would have in Adams a strong ally in his first political 
test. 
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After Eisenhower officially became a candidate for the nomination, 
Adams played a major part in his campaign. He restated his support of 
Eisenhower in a speech before the National Republican Club in New York 
City on January 29, 1952, saying that the General was the most qualified 
person in the country for the office of President, and the one with the 
best chance of winning an election.25 Adams 1 campaigning in Ne~ Hampshire 
led the General to victory in the state's preferential primary in March, 1952.26 
The candidate met his New !iigland supporter for the first time at a 
meeting of New Hampshire delegates to the Republican National Convention 
on June 91 1952, at Eisenhower's home in Morningside Heights. 27 Adams 
continued his service to Eisenhower, acting as his floor manager at the 
Republican National Convention.28 Adams attributed his appointment to this 
position primarily to the fact that he was the only Republican leader identi~ 
fied neither with Hobert A. Taft, the General's opponent for the nomination 
at the convention, nor Thomas DeHey;9 and t6"h±s)~port of the Houston 
Manifesto)0 The Manifesto, prompted by attempts in Houston to discredit 
Eisenhower delegates by claiming that Democrats had voted in the primaries, 
led to the II fair plJY rule, 11 which required tm t delegates be accepted unanimously 
by the convention in order to be seated.31 
After Eisenhower received the nomination at the Republican Convention, 
Herbert Brownell, one of his major advisers, suggested to him that Sherman 
Adams be made ,~aignM,anager.32 When asked on July 22 if he l-Tould accept 
the position, the formertloorKamager responded enthusiastic~, but indicated 
that he needed time to make some arrangements before he could officially 
accept.33 The Governor requested and rece~ved the consent of the New 
Hampshire Governor's Council to take a leave of absence from his duties in 
the state.34 
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Thus relieved of his responsibilities in New ~shire, Adams was able 
to devote himself to the CaJJI.Paign. Throughout the campaign, the nominee 1 s 
staff had the task of mapping strategy for a candidate who distrusted 
politi.cal maneuvering. 35 Adams 1 lnain job was to achie~l~Wbetueen the old 
~e conservative Republicans and the more liberal tisenhower supporters.36 
Although enough of the difficulties within the party were resolved to enable 
Eisenhower to win the election, Adams and the General's other backers could 
not reconcile all the hostile party leaders to the candidate. 'lhese men 
attempted to block the President's legislative program in Songress once he 
took office. 37 ':::·,Thus, the differences between Adams and some of the Republican 
leaders developed while the IYovernor was still Qampaign ~anager for Eisenhawer;: 
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Chapter II 
Assistant to the President 
After the November, 1952 election, the victorious Dwight D. Eisenhower 
faced the task of choosing his cabinet and staff. He asked Sherman Adams 
to serve as Assistant to the President, 1 an· indication of the high regard 
he felt for his former Campaign Manager. The Governor exhibited some reluc-
tance to accept this position, an attitude which led Eisenhoiver to fear that 
his Aide did not attach as much importance to the position as he himself ~2 
Adams did accept t~ position, however, and Eisenhower announced the intended 
appointment on November 24.3 
The office of Assistant to the President had existed in the administra-
tion of Harry s. Truman, but Eisenhower.is Aide wielded more responsibility 
and power than had his predecessors.4 Although he coordinated almost all 
problems dealing with political or domestic polici, the Assistant was never 
delegated the authority or power of the Presidency itsel£.6 His job 
included the settling of small problems within the executive branch of 
the government, 7 approving appointments of officials to the federal commissions 
and agencies, and the answering of all legitimate inquiries or requests of 
8 
th! executive. When making decisions, the President sought Adams 1 mark of 
approval, "0 .K., s.A. II on papers brought to him, and if this signature was 
missing, the L1.ief t-xecutive seldom consented to the proposal without further 
investigation.9 A comment by Eisenhower that Adams w-1as lithe one person who 
reaJ.ly knows what I am trying to dO 111 0 shows the ~ent of the confidence 
the ~ef had in his <Assistant's abilities to do his administrative work 
well. 
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Adams• office was the hub around which \illite House business revolved. 11 
In the course of one normal day, he placed thirty telephone calls, and 
members of his staff handled 120 calls. 12 The Assistant • s day was filled 
with appointments and conferences; in which such topics as the administra-
tion1s programs, patronage, and job interviews demanded attention.13 
In addition, he conferred with the President several times and handled 
voll.Ulles of paperwork.14 The President's Aide worked efficiently, trying 
to insure the orderly functioning of the government while abiding by his 
own conviction that a good administrative staff worker should bother the 
President as seldom as possible.15 
Adams received pointed criticism as a result of the polrer of his 
-
position. Some Congressmen felt that he prevented them from seeing the 
· President,16 a charge which the assistant explicitly denied, 17 and that 
his control of appointments violated their prerogative of patronage.18 
A nl.Ullber of observers suggested that when Governor Adams presented a program 
to President Eisenhm-rer, he gave only one side of the picture and left the 
President poorly informed on some. issues.19 At the heart of all these criti-
cisms lay the idea that Sherman Adams ti'as a kind or second President, 
hindering the relations of other government officials tdth the chief executive. 
In addition to the enemies he made inthe execution of his duties, Adams 
alienated others by the abruptness of his personality. The epitoDzy" of 
the stereotyped conception of a New Englander, the Assistant to the President 
was thought of as stern, innnensely capable in his work, and completely 
upright morally. 20 So strongly did the man feel his own integrity that 
he assl.Ulled it was taken for granted by others.21 Characterized by bluntness, 
Adams was noted for putting down the telephone receiver at the conclusion of 
9 
a call without the courtesy of a good-by. 22 This mixture o~almost unapproach-
1 
able virtue and forbidding abruptness made the New Englander unpopular with 
many. The geniality Adams showed at times in his leisure hours or on social 
occasions23 was virtually unknown to those who associated with him only for 
business purposes. 
the first Eisehhower administration, 
~n.gfo. the 'Presidential ~sistant played fole in a case before the 
Securities and Exchange Commission which brought charges of executive 
interference .from Capitol Hill. Tre President decided in his budget 
planning sessions of 1954 to limit the expansion of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority by denying TVA the privilege o~anding its facilities to 
serve Hemphis, Tennessee and the Atomic Energy Plant at Paduclf. Kentucky. 24 
Subsequentzy, the Bureau of the Budget and the Atomic Energy Commission 
began to negotiate with the Middle South Utilities Company, headed by 
Edgar H. Dixon and the Southern Company, of which E. A. Yates was chairman, 
for the construction of an electrical plant to supply Memphis and Paducah.25 
The project was lmown as Dixon-Yates from the names of the heads of the two 
companies involved in it.26 
Before he retired .from the office of Director of the Budget on April 
,, 
15, 1954, Joseph Dodge had asked Adolph Wenzell, a retired vice-president 
,, 
and director of the First Boston Corporation, which helped finance Dixon-
Yates, to advise the government on this matter.27 Wenzell ~l.:ain~d.C·~;:;connection 
with\D.ixoll"'!"Yat.es-.:.~~o'?Dodg~ Tan~:hi§l s.1lc:<:!;l:}sor.;.d1.oland Hughes;-: ·.--·~ · ··_.:;, but 
the government officials did not consider Wenzell a major consultant in 
the project, nor did they think of the possibility that he might be advising 
both government and business simultaneously. 28 In August, 1954, at the 
request of President Eisenhower, Hughes and Lewis Strauss, AEC Chairman, 
prepared a chronological account of the part of the government in the 
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Dixon-Yates deal. 29 They omitted Wenzell 1 s name from tl].e account altogether, 
which Adams later interpreted as proof that they thought he was of little 
importance.30 
The Democrats in Congress I displeased with the minimization or the opera-
tions of 'NA,31 fo'Wld in the person of Adolph Wenzell a chance to thwart 
the administration!s program. In Febru.ar,y-1 Senator idster Hill (D-Al3~) 
having discovered the involvement of Wenzell in both parts of the negotia-
. 32 
tions, asked Hughes what part Wenzell had had in the matter. Hughes 
Ylenzell , 
stated that ~:was ~ government consultant who had been left out of the 
report issued in August because he was unimportant, and in order to avoid 
controversyl but did not mention his affiliation with the '"flr.sh Boston 
Corporation.33 Hughes' motives for telling a half-truth in this case are 
I 
unclear, but his failure to divulge Wenzell s true position gave credence 
n 
to the notion that all was not well with the Dixon-Yates negotiations. 
Hill capitalized on Hughes• statement, charging Wenzell with involve-
ment on both s~des of the contract and Hughes with atte~ting to hide this 
fact. 34 Eisenhower, poorl\1 informed, denied that Wenzell had ever advised 
the government on Dixon-Yates.35 When the White House learned the truth, 
James Hagerty, the President's press secretary, issued a statement mmnimizit~ 
the place of Wenzell in the government's planning.36 
On June ll, 19551 in the middle of the furor over the double role of 
Adolph Wenzell in Dixon-Yates, Hughes called Sherman Adams to ask him dJ: 
he could have the SEC hearings on financing plans for Dixon-Yates postponed 
from June 13 in order that the Bureau of the Budget could confer with adviscem 
about some of the testimony to be given.37 Adams arranged for the delay 
with SEC Chairman Sinclair Armstrong.38 
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On Honday, June 131 the day on which Wenzell had been scheduled to 
testif,y before the SEC, the House voted favorably on an appropriation 
ltl ''39 for transmission lines between the Dixon-Yates plant and TVA facilities. 
When Wen~ell•s position became lmown1 accusations, primarily by Democrats, 
arose in both houses of Congress that Adams had purposely delayed the SEC 
hearing at ldlich the adviser would testify" in order to insure the passage 
of the appropriation. Senator Estes Kefauver (D-Tennessee) 1 40 said in 
the Senate that Adams apparent],y wanted to conceal information which would 
have changed the House decision on the financing of the transmission line.41 
Others, including Senator Jotm Sparkman (D-Alabama), li2 Senator Wayne Morse 
(R-oregon), 43 and Representatives Charles Price (D-Illinois)44 and Thomas 
Abernathy (D-Mississippi)4.5 also criticized Adams• interference. 
This assault on the Assistant to the President did not provide the 
political capital the Democrats had hoped. Sensing that the issue was too 
complex to stir the public 1 they allowed it to drop. 46. In the case of 
Dixon-Yates, however, the hostile feeling of some Congressmen toward Adams 
became vocal. Another issue was needed to crystallize new animosities and 
redirect existing ones into a full-scale attack. 
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Chapter III 
The Goldfine Case Begins 
On January 27, 1958,1 the special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight 
of the House Committee on Interstate and ~oreign Commerce began its hearings. 
;;... 
The body, established at the request of Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn, 
sought to investigate the regulatory ~gencies of the federal government to 
w~f<.. 
find out l'rllether or not th~performing the functions for which they had 
been created.3 The Congressional agency had held preliminary hearings in 
4 5 ~ October, 1957. Morgan M. Moulder (D-Mo.) served as chairman of the body, 
but Oren Harris (D-Ark.lj1 chairman of the full committee, 8 had voting privileges 
as an ex-officio member. 9 
. 
The first days of the hearings indicated that the sessions would not 
be quiet and uneventful. The subcommittee fired its chief counsel, Dr. Bernard 
10 Schwartz, on February 10. The discharged attorney claimed that he was 
dismissed because he insisted upon thorough probing into the practices of 
some of the. federal agencies.11 Schwartz publicly declared that he had evidence 
that woul.d show that certain public officials, including Adams, had used their 
influence in the affairs of the regulatory agencies.12 
After the discharge of Schwartz, Chairman 1-loUJ.der, who had supported 
the policies of the counsel, resigned his postl3 When hearings resumed on 
·-· . "" ~~~~~ 13; Oren Harris took over as chairman of the investigating body. 14 
He announced his intention to conduct open and thorough investigations, 
staking his political life on the action of the group with the words, 11I 
will stand o~ fall on the success of this investigation. 111 5 This represented 
a change from his statement in an executive session on January 8.16 At 
that time he had reconunended the avoidance of charges of imporpriety because 
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of their political implications and suggested that the hearings proceed on 
a general level, looking into the legal aspects of the work of all the 
commissions.17 It is possible that in the time that had elapsed since 
he had shurmed careful probings because of the effect they might have on 
politics, the Democratic Congressman, who, like all Congressmen, was..,up for 
reelection in 1958, reC]!.l.ized that the ~lications issuing forth from the 
investigation might help him and his party. 
In April, Harris sent representatives of the subcommittee to Boston to 
conduct an open hearing.18 Information gathered there led to the investiga-
tion of industrialist Bernard Goldfine and his relationship to Sherman Adams.19 
Goidfine-, 1mo came to the United States from R.Issia as a young child in 18971 a:> 
entered the textile industry at the age of 19.21 Business prospered, and 
in 1958, Goldfine o-vmed textile mills and real estate worth millions of 
dollars. 22 Described by friends as a shre1-1d businessman who lacked knowledge 
of the details of business and government regulations, 23 Goldfine engaged 
in practices contrary to the rulings of the Fl'C and the SEC. 
Joseph T. Conlon, an attorney for the subcommittee, testified on June 10 
that the East Boston Compazzy-, which was owned by Goldfine, had failed to file 
forms required by the SEC for the years 1948-1954.24 On July 131 1955, the 
Massachusetts District Federal District Court ordered these reports sent to the 
SEC. 25 East Boston filed a set of papers on December 16, 1955, but these did 
not comply with the regulations of the SEC because the data given were in-
accurate, and they vrere not certified by an independent accountant. 26 
Consequently 1 the SEC be gam criminal proceedings against East Boston on 
April 2, 1956, charging the company with cont~t. 27 Three days:.later, the 
case was dismi:ssed 1-dth the agreement that East Boston pay a $3,000 fine 
to the SEC for civil contempt and that the required papers be filed with 
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the SEC ·within ninety days. 28 On November 18, 1956, the Boston court ruled 
that the company had not yet obeyed this order.29 Consequently, Alw.y.ne 
F. Jealous, Mild.Ded Paperman, and Horace and Bernard Goldfine, officers 
and directors of East Boston Company were judg~ responsible. 30 
Francis x. McLaughlin, another subcommittee attorney,31 introduced 
the records of the Sheraton-Plaza Hotel in Boston.32 These records had been 
subpoenaed because the committee had heard charges that Adams had helped 
Goldfine in his difficulties with the FTC in return for gifts and entertain-
ment from Goldfine.33 The reo&rds of the hotel showed that from November 
24, 1955 through l1ey 61 1958, Goldfine had paid eleven separate bills at 
the Sheraton amounting to some $1642 for Adams or members of his family. 34 
MCLaughlin also reported that Goldfine did not maintain a suite at the Sheraton 
on a regular basis.35 
Major General Wilton B. Persons, Eisenhower's liaison with eongress, 36 
called Adams at a fishing resort where he was vacationing and told him of 
the development in the hearing. 37 Adams returned to \'iashington immediately, 
and on June 12 he wrote a letter to Oren Harris e:xplaining his association 
with Goldfine.38 Adams did not discuss the reasons for his friendship with 
Goldfine with the subcorumittee, and thus the basis of the relationship is 
unclear. Their friendship began while Adams was Speaker of the New Hampshif~. 
House of Representatives when Norris Cotton, then a state legislator, introduced 
the two, describing Goldfine to Adams as a successful manufacturer and 
an asset to the New England textile industry.39 While Governor of New Hamp-
shire.) Adams. attended a meeting of Goldfine 1 s employees, to which the industrialist 
had also invited the Governors of Massachusetts, ~ and Vermont.40 
1.5 
Friendship developed between the t"ro men, and the mutual giving of gifts 
expressed the esteem each had for the other.41 Adams claimed that he m d 
no interest in Goldfine's business except as it related to the welfare of the 
New Englanders it supported.42 Since Goldfine's fondness for the great and 
infl.uential was well known~3 his interest in Adams is readily understandable. 
Goldfine apparently cult:Uiated the friendship, and Adams, who had proved his 
interest in business while Governor of New Hampshire considered the indus-
# 
trialist an important builder of Nerr England's economy. Goldfine's geniality 
!.; . ' 
attracted Adams,45 and the Governor accepted his friend at face value. 
In his letter to the committee, Adams stated that his family and ~ldfine 1s 
had been friends for more than fifteen years, and that they had entertained 
each other in their homes. 46 According to AdaJJ1S1 Goldfine had invited him to 
stay in his suite at the Sher~on-Plaza whenever he was in Boston, and Adams, 
thinking that Goldfine rented the suite continuously, had accepted the hos-
pitality.47 The letter also mentioned that the Adamses had been guests 
of the Goldfines at the Mayflower Hotel in Plymouth, Massachusetts in 1957 • 4B 
Turning in his letter to the calls involving Goldfine's problems with 
the regulatory agencies which he had made, Adams related that late in 19.5~ 
after Goldfine had asked him the purpose of a letter he had received from 
the FTC, he had called FTC Chairman Edv;ard F. Howrey and asked if he could 
secure 
on the 
this information for Goldfine. 49 Adams sent Goldfine a memorandum 
subject prepared by Howrey in response to this query.50 About a 
month after the issuing of the memorandum, Adams 1 sectetary called the FTC 
to find out if the case was still being studied.51 She learned that it had 
been closed two weeks previously following an agreement by Goldfine to 
change his labels to conform with the provisions of the ~lool Labeling Ac.t.52 
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In the spring of 1955, Adams continued, he a.rrapged an appointment for 
Goldfine with Howrey, at Goldfine's request_.5J Adams maintained that he in 
no t.:ra:y attempted to influence Howrey concerning the matter to be discussed 
at the conference, nor did he learn from Goldfine that some time after. the 
meeting, FrO proceedings against Goldfine's firm led to a cease and desist 
order.54 The industrialist asked him for no favors in this matter, Adams 
said. 55 
Regarding insinuations by the subcommittee that he had intervened in 
Goldfine's behalf in the East Boston Case before the SEC, A4ams asserted 
,, 
that he had the President 1 s Special Counsel inquire into this matter to 
which Goldfine alluded in conversation.56 The ~te House lavr,rer talked 
with the General Counsel of the sEe, but he did not mention Adams 1 name, 
or make any suggestions pertaining to the disposition of the case.57 Adams 
took no action at all after he received the report of the attorney.58 
This call, which 'was not requested by Goldfine, was the only contact of the 
vnrrite House staff with the SEC about Goldfine's affairs.59 Adams concluded 
his letter with a strong sentence suggesting that the subcommittee could and 
should have acquired this:;_information before it public~ i@plied improper 
behavior on his part.60 
On the ~ that Adams sent his letter to the investigating bo~, protests 
against his deeds began in &,ngress. Senator \'layne :Norse, who had switched 
his allegiance from the Republican to the Democratic party since his attack 
61 
on Adams' handling of the DiXon-Yates problem, said thcrt. he had seen Adams 1 
letter, and he felt that as a result of his public admissions, popular 
opinion would demand the departure of the Presidential ~de from public life.62 
This approach indicated clearly not only what Morse believed would happen, 
but also what he hoped would acme about, and thus, his statement was a battle 
17 
cry for antiwAda.m.s partisans to agitate for his dismissal. 
Any hope Adams entertained that his letter would explain satis.t'actorily 
his part in Goldfine's cases with federal agencies quiekly proved futile. 
New hints of Gold.t'ine 1s gifts to the President's ~ssistant came to light out-
side of the committee. On June 14 the New York Post claimed that Goldfine 
paid $2400 for an Oriental rug intended for Adams, and rumors circulated in 
New England that the industrialist had also given the Governor a vicuna coat 
' 63 ... __ 
worth $700. As a result of the disclosures made up to that-ri.me, Repre-
sentative Peter F. Mack, Jr. (D.-I~~ a member of the investigating body, 
called for Adams 1 immediate resignation.65 
When hearings resumec\on June 16, Oren. Harris. restated the purpose of tlB 
{,IJJ 
investigation. He emphasized its intention to determine whether the regu-
latory agencies stayed within the \roundaries provided by law, to recommend 
legislation necessar,r to enable the bodies to function efficiently, and to 
decide if the Commissions were free from outside influence.67 The memorandun 
'fllrl.ch Edward F. Howrey, FTC Chairman at the time of the Goldfine case before 
that body, had written Adams concerning Goldfine 1s problrhms with the FTC 
was placedfn the record.68 This communication explained that in November, 
1953, Einiger 11ills had lodged a complaint against llhrthfield Mills, a 
Goldfine firm, ·, 1 charging that Northfield had labeled fabrics 1190% wool, 
1 O% vicuna, n when the cloth actually contained nylon fiber. 'P9 Northfield 
to correct all labels they would use in the fu.ure 
wote to the wool division of the FTC on November 17, 1953, promisingA in'.~ • 
compliance with the provisions of the Wool Products Labeling Act, which required 
accurate listing of all the different fibers in a fabric.7.~ After more 
correspondence, the CFTC~'Vl<>oli..Divisiori-.Cbief.;.;r:. : L. :.: .• ~ • .: " had said that if 
the Soldfine firm would promise to correct all its labels, the matter could 
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be settled on a 11voluntary cooperative basis" without legal action. 71; 
In testimony before the committee on June 16, Robert F. Secrest, Acting 
FTC Chairman, ~a explained that the reason the Northfield case was dropped 
in 1953 was that there was a general misunderstanding of the Wool Products 
Labeling Act.7~ Manufacturers had thought a 5% error in labeling was permis-
sible in the analysis of non-wool products.Yh Because this misinterpretati~ 
of the law existed, the FTC atte:rrpted to clarify it by stating that the 
descriptions of fiber content had to be exa~t, but took no action agruu1st 
Northfield and other companies that had unknowinglY violated the law.?$ 
Secrest further explained that in 1955, Goldfine's Northfield firm was 
challenged on its labeling of a particular fabris "90% wool, 10% guanaco. 76 
After a study 1o'Lh~uFT6o:h~aueao-.a complaint and cease and desist orders against 
Goldfine texti~ compani~fi, 
NoDthfield 1-H.lls, Leganon Woolen Mills, Strathmore Woolen orpg:;atiot~~ J and 
Horace and Bernard Goldfine. 71 An FTC attorney had recommended misdeameanor 
proceedings against Bernard Goldfine, but the Commission had overruled this 
suggestion.78 Secrest claimed that the Commission's action against the advice 
of its attorney was not unusual, that the evidence did not support misdemeanor 
charges, and that by naming Bernard Goldfine explicit:J;.y, the cease and desist 
order prohibited his engaging in similar practices elsewhere.qy 
Secrest also denied ~ knowledge of the meeting between Goldfine and 
FTC members on April 14, 1955,89 t-rhich Adams had admitted arranging, 83 
until he saw the records in 1956.82 Harvey H. Hannah, head of the FI'C Wool 
Division, who had attended the 1955 meeting with Goldfine on the guanac:o 
pDoblem, said he did not know that Adams had arranged it. 83 Hannah recalled 
that after the meeting, Goldfine lR d asked an FTC secretary to get Adams on 
the telephone, and the industrialist had told him that he had fared well in 
his discussions with the FTC. 8~ The Wool chief testified that he had con-
sidered this to be name-dropping on Goldfine's part, and had ignored it as such. 
8~ 
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Edvrard Howrey, Fl'C Chairman at the time of the Goldfine cases, said that 
Adams called his office asking information on the Northgield Mills case, 
and that he had supplied this without consulting anyone else. 00 The 
former FTC Chairman conceded that he had received no other calls from Adams 
about mislabeling, but asserted that the White House or Congressmen frequently 
ca.lled him. f/;(Ji Howrey stated that his policy was to discuss matters related 
to the investigatory side of tij.e FTC with anyone who aske~ and the quasi-
judicial, where definite legal proceedings were initiated, with no one.SfiJ 
At the time Adams called Howrey, the Goldfine case was not a judicial matter. 
The witness did not recall talking with Adams 1 sec~etary and saying that the 
case had been closed, but he added that the call probably went through his 
office.~ 
Regarding Adams 1 call to the FTC in 1955, Howrey said he didn •t remem-
ber w~ether Adams or his office called.92 He asserted that he did not con-
sider Adams' communication to mean he had a special interest in the case.913 
In response to a query by Oren Harris as to why Goldfine had Adams call if 
any citizen could have secured the same information, Howrey said that if 
Adams couldn't do what anybody else could, then 11\'iashington is different from 
what I thought it was.~~ Harris snapped back, nit is different from what 
you thought. 93 This retort showed the committee i ~·· chairman 1 s disapproval of 
Adams' action and his inclination to make the President's assistant appear 
in the worst possible light. 
On the same dJhtte~.,testimony in the subcommittee indicated Adams 1 part 
in the Fl'C affairs, subcommittee attorney Z.!cLaughlin presented information 
subpoenaed from the Waldorf-Astoria in New York.~4 The hotel's records showed 
that Goldfine had paid a bill of $219.65 for Sherman Adams and his wife 
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Rachel covering February 12-15, 1954.95 Uoldfine had also entertained the 
Adamses at the Hayflol.ver Hotel in Plymouth, Massachusetts in J~, 19$7, 
paying some $262 for the e:x:ecuti ve and his wife. 96 
_., 
The day.'prproceedings had done nothing to relieve the pressure on Adams. 
Although his explanation of his communications with the FTC lB.d been upheld, 
the chairman of the subcommittee had indicated his disapproval of the .Amsistant 1s 
actions even if they were what Adams said and no more. He had anticipated 
the questions about the bills at the Mayflower Hotel, and had therefore been 
able at least to appear to offer that information voluntarily, but this 
was not true of the visits he had paid at the vlaldorf-Astoria. The existence 
of undue exertion of influence had not been proved, but the fact that Adams 
had at the same time accepted lavish gifts from a ftiend and communicated 
with government agencies for him raised serious questions about his morality 
or his judgment. 
During the day on June 16 and June 17, the pace of CongressionaJ. criticism 
of Adams quickened. Senator Ross Bass (D.-Tenn. )~ placed an editorial from 
the Nashville Tennessean in the Record. ·;98'' This p-ticle pointecf>ut that Adams 
had great power at the White House and was sometimes virtually in charge, ani 
that the Assist~t to the President had interfered with government agencies 
once before, in the Dixon-Yates case. ;99. The editor had taken the position 
that Adams should be fired, and Bass agreed with this, calling Adams 1 action 
a 11travesty oii honesty and integrity.n100 The next day, Senator ¥.10rse took 
the issue beyond a criticism of a man and asked for the defeat of the tarniShed 
administration in the elections of 1958 and 1960.1<n With Adams as their 
leader in 195:6, the Republicans had used a corruption in government cappaign 
102 
theme, and the Democrats now hinted at reversing the charge in the upcoming 
election. The possibility of being a political liability to his party was 
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Having failed in his first effort to quiet the storm around him~) Admns 
felt t"e necessity of making another atte::;pt. Therefore, accompanied by his 
1 
wife and ~ihite House Counsel Gerald ~~iorgan, the Governor voluntarily2 
appeared before the subcommittee on June 17 to discuss his relationship with 
Bernard Goldfine. J Feeling that the body before v1hich he would appear was 
controlled by Democrats who were angry because of a politically-oriented 
speech he had made in Minneapolis earlier in the year,4 Adams expected no 
sympathy from the group.5 
In a prepared statement, Ad:,ms defined his duty as to assist the President 
in whatever ways possible.6 lie had made requests to various commissioners, 
but he contended that his motives were honest, and that if it had been rrrong 
to do vrhat he had done, he was guilty of an error in judgment. 7 
Turning to his relationship with Bernard Goldfine, Adams said that the 
exch1:1.nge of gifts was mutual. 8 He admitted that Goldfine had given him a vicuna 
I 
coat, which Adams valued at $69, a product of the industry of which the 
9 businessman was proud. Adams 1 estimate of the worth of the coat differed 
greatly from the price that had been generally quoted, but the cash value 
of the coat was not the reih.l issue at stake. The industrialist had given 
vicuna cloth to the forty-eight state governors in 1955.10 Of the much 
publicized Oriental rug, Adams said that Go~dfine had wanted to give it to him, 
but because the Governor's New Ha!)lpsl:i:i.:re home v1as too small for the rug, the 
two had agreed that the Bostonian would reclaim it when Adams left Washington.11 
'l'he witness asserted that his friend had told him that he kept a r10tel suite 
on a continuing basis, and had invited him to use it whenever this was 
convenient.12 On the other hand, Adams pointed out that his famil~ had given 
h l d . t 13 t e Goldfines presents, indluding a watc1 an a p1c ure. 
Regarding his contacts with the SEC and FTC, Eisenhower's. Aide denied 
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that he had sought favors for Goldfine ~r1 that his friend had benefited from 
his actions.14 The Governor declared that his conscience was clear.15 
Having heard Goldfine complain of mistreatment by the SEC in 19561 Adams had 
16 . .-~, ·· · .· ·· '.·,-·,r 
the White House Special Counsel inquire into the matter. When told bY the 
attorney .1ihat his friend had violated SEC regulations, Adams dropped the 
matter without informing the industrialist of his inquiry.17 
In the FTC case 1 the connnission 1 s counsel had accused Adams of breaking 
rules by divulging the name of the plaintiff, 18 but Adams said he did not 
know of the rule, and.EH~wrey 1 s memorandum had not mentioned it.19 Subcommittee 
Counsel Lishman asserted that the fact that Goldfine got information that was 
usu~~ barred from the public proved that Adams h~~nfluenced the commis-~o 1 
sions. Since the White House 1s venture into the SEC was small and indirect, 
and the FTC took action against Goldfine after Adams' 1~~ call, the conten-
tion that Goldfine received special favors from the commissions was untenable 
. ~(\'\ 
o~other grounds. 
Arter Adams completed his statement, he submitted to questioning u.Y 
.:l-1 
subcommittee members. John J. Flynt, Jr. (D-Ga.) asked Adams if he thought 
that actions he performed influenced others simply because he was Assistant 
~~ 
to the President. The witness admit~ed that this was possible, and that that 
was a valid point for the body to study.23 Joseph P. O'Hara (R-Hinn)~\ne 
of the more sympathetic Congressmen·., to Adams, said that. he himself had per-
formed 20,000 services in answer to his constituents• requests in his two 
J[ear term, and that Adams was doing the same king of thing.-25 According to 
O'Hara, if confidential FTC information was divulged, Howrey, not Adams, 26 
. ,4 • f h ru1 . 27 . bl 28 
who had testified that he was unaware o sue a e, was responsl. e. 
In contrast to the moderation of O'Hara, the inquiries of John E. Moss 
(D-Calif.) 29 and Chairman Harris were aimed to embarrass the witness. Moss 
asked if the reports that Adams had received gifts from Goldfine other than 
those previously mentioned were true, and the presidential assistant listed 
some 11small mats," and a suit of clothes as presents from his friend.30 
Moss alluded to the bitterness of the 1952 campaign, in which he: and other 
Democrats were swamped 1dth criticism because of the behavior ,_. . <:. - _ "'"-·" ~· 
of officials in the Truman administration, s¢ng that the Republicans shouJd 
conform to the standards they had sought to iW,pose on the Democrats.31 
In answer to a question from Harris, Adams admitted that he ha1power 
to clear appointments of32 and to fire33 officials of regulatory agencies, 
and that Howrey was an appointee of his.34 The Arkansas Representative 
questioned whether the power of the executive to dismiss commissioners was 
consistent with the independent status of the commissions. 35 Harris • final 
question went to the heart of the issue at stake. He asked Adams if he felt 
that, :d:onsidering his friendship with Goldfine, he had acted improperly 
in his communications with federal agencies.36 The reply Adams gave took the 
form of self-reproach. He admitted that he and his staff had agreed that they 
should so conduct themselves that such a question would never arise.37 Adams 
concluded his appearance without apologies, but admitting that he should 
have exercised more "prudence 11 in the cases under discussion. 38 
Throughout the week of turmoil concerning the hearings, President Eisen-
hower had refrained from <ll'llllllenting. At his press conference on July 18, how-
ever, he read a statement of his position in the Adams case.39 Differentiating~ 
between a gift as an expression of friendship, and a bribe as "evil, 11 the 
President said that the people should judge cases of gift giving and receiving 
according to the charapter, motives, and subsequent behavior of the recipient.4G 
He contended that everyone who knew Adams trusted him thoroughly. 4l Eisenhower 
admitted, however, that in leaving his actions open to criticism, his 
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t\ssistant,had been imprudent.42 Expressing his satisfaction with Adams' 
presentation to the subcommittee, and his confidence in him, Eisenhower said, 
11I personally like Governor Adams. I admire his abilities. I respect him. 
because of his personal and official integrity, I need him.n43 
At the conclusion of his remarks, Eissnhower referred all further questions 
to Press .Secretary Hagerty. 44 The~., 11-ess ~ecretary did attempt to clear up 
the charge made by Oren Harris that Adams had illegally given confidential 
information from Howrey's memorandum to Goldfine.45 The supposedly secret 
part of the cammmication, the ma.m.e of the complaintant, J..aJ ceased to be 
confidential before Adams sent it to Goldfine, 46 according to FTC Chairman 
Howrey, because the memorandum had become public information.47 Also, the 
complaining compaQY, Einiger Mills, ha~or.med Northfield of its action.48 
This, too, destroyed any secret character the note might otherwise have had.49 
Thus, the White House sought to remove the stigma of illegality from Adams' 
acts, although the charge of imprudence remained. 
Adams 1 testimony and Eisenhower 1 s defense of his aide aroused storms 
of indignation on Capitol Hill and in the press~ On June 181 Senator ~1orse, 
the most outspoken of Adams' Congressional critics, asked for support for a 
bill he was sPOnsoring to have all gover.bment officials, including Congressmen, 
making more than $10,000 report on their sources of income.5° He called for 
the immediate departure of the Assistant to the President from the government.51 
In direct answer to Eisenhower 1 s statement in support ·of his aide, Morse 
asseeted that he for one did not trust the honesty of Adams' character.52 
\ 
This condemnation was almost unique, as most attacks centered on grounds other 
than the moral. Norse: continued, calling the Eisenhower admini-stration the 
most morally corrppt in the country's history.53 The final blow aimed at the 
a.dm:ini.stration that day was an assertion that na President who has made such 
a sorry redord in regard to political morality would need this fellow; but. • • 
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t.he American people do not need him."54 Obviously, the Adams case was to 
~rse an excuse to lash out against the Eisenhower regime rather than a 
, matte:e to be oonsidere4n its own merits. 
Senator John Williams (R-Del. )55 expressed his views by citing an editorial 
.£/1, 
from the \'lilmington Journal of June 18. Williams held that Adams was :morally 
upright, and that he 1rould not have allowed gifts to determine his political 
acts.57 The Senator did, however, assert that Adams should resign to spare -fJ,e. 
President embarrassment.58 This interest in the position of the President, 
associated with estimates of political expediency 1 state+r implied, in an 
election year, recurred in the thinking of the Republican politicians. 
The press as well as the politicians devoted attention to the imPlications 
of the Adams case. There were suggestions that Adams resign in order to 
maintain for the government the high standard of ethics he had demanded~9and 
that Adams was a handicap rather than an asset to the govermnent 60 and the 
61 party. MOst agreed that the Governor ought to leave office, and one 
article, bypassing the intermediate step of reconnnending that he resign, 
called Adam's departure "a political inevitability.u63 
One defense which wa~ffered for the President's assistant revolved 
around the practices of the chief executive.63 The President was known to 
accept expensive gifts for his Gettysburg farm, a fact which made it incon-
sistent to criticiae his aide .for receiving presents. 64 The editor, in 
summarizing his view, wrote, 11It is pretty rough to penalize a man for doing 
what the boss does.u65 
In startling condemnation of the administration, basing its conclusion 
on the similarity of Adams • ;Jpresentation to the subcomm:i ttee and Nixon 1 s 
television address in 1952 explaining the c&paign fund issue, one article 
suggested that the President himsel.f wrote the scripts.~ The plan was to 
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appeal to human sympathy through dignified adrnission of the facts of the 
accusation and the simultaneous denial of any wrongdoing.f'f The philosophy 
basically was to 11 concede the charge but finesse the implication. 1168 Feel-
ing that Adc::ms had committed a moral offense, the article1 s writer predicted 
69 
that the case would stey in the headlines until AdL:ms was forced out. 
Although the basic thesis that Eisenhmver wrote the statements for Adwns 
and Nixon is undoc'Llr.lented by the editor, and Adams 1 accounts of the two F 
70 
episodes give no indication of such involvement on Eisenhov;er1 s part, 
the deeper interpretations of the article have merit. Ad8lns and the 
President did fail to face the logical consequences of the situation, 
seeming to be o~:>livious to the fact that in high office, irnprudence is as 
undesirable as immorality. The idea that the press would continue to feature 
the proclem of the President 1 s Assistant proved correct, as newspaper and 
magazine editors not only reported the facts;; and the rwnors, but b:r adding 
their voices to the crescendo of protest against the Governor, they actually 
intensified the difficulties of the situation. 
Chapter V 
More Testimo~ and Reaction 
The subcommittee continued to study the actions of Eisenhower 1 s 
.a: Boston businessman1 
right-hand man, and when hearings resumed on June 26, John Fol{,took 
the stand.1 Fox had given the investigating body in Boston information 
about the Adams-Goldtine relationship. 2 Although still a millionaire, 
he had lost most of the fortune he had accl.nllUlated in gas, railroads, 
banking, real estate, and coi11IllUilications investments in the bankruptcy 
of the Boston Post, of which he had been publisher.3 At the time of his 
Washington testimony the witness, accused of libel against a Pittsburg 
lawyer, was out of jail on $2,500 bond. 4 A discredited and embittered 
businessman, he blamed Goldfine for his financial problems.5 
Pointing to the nature of the criminal proceedings against Fox and 
stating that this same man had accused their client of embezzling in a 
Boston Court, Goldfine's attorne,ys requested the committee to hear Fox's 
testimony in a closed, executive session, in order to spare the reputation 
of Adams• friend from the witness• wild accusations.6 The Harris Committee 
denied this application.? This decision brought charges of irresponsibility 
8 
against the investigating body from Congress and the press. The discredited 
tycoon testified that on May 10, 1955, Goldfine told him of his problems 
with the no' and admitting that he was intentionally violating the law re-
garding labeling of fabrics, said that Adams had told him he would handle 
the situation. 9 Later, Gold.:t:inS indicated to P.ox that Adams had settled 
the matter.10 The witness added that the industrialist had also said he had 
no worries in his cases before the ~ as long as Adams had influence in 
Washington. ll Fox claimed that Goldfine had also informed him that he had 
given Adams substantial financial aid when the Governor's children were 
in College, 12 and that he had bought stocks for his politioian-friend.13 
The next day Fox continued his hearsay--based testimony, quoting 
Goldfine as seying he gave all the senators vicuna coats, and that some-
time after J~, 1955 he h~ purchased a Washington home for Adams.14 
Representative 0 1Hara,- who had previously shown himself sympathetic to 
Adams, announced that he had written the President's Aide a letter on 
June 25 telling him that Fox would testify that Goldfine had bought stocks 
and a home in Washington for him.l5 The Representative had with -him a 
rep:cy from the Governor, in which he informed the committee that he rented 
his house in the Capitol city. 16 Claiming that he and Goldfine had no 
common business interests and that the industrialist had never bought stock 
for him, the Assistant to the President criticized the investigating body 
for allowing Fox· to testify in open court.17 The letter.·reinforced Adams 1 
statements at his first formal press conference the previous day, at which 
time he denied all of Fox's charges, calling them "preposterous" and 
11malicious. u18 
The final chapter of Fox 1 s wild testimony unfolded on June 30 when 
he reported Goldfine's remarks on his SEC problems.19 The former publisher 
admitted .that he had sworn on April 16, 1958 in I1assachusetts District 
Court that Goldfine had told him his East Boston Co:mpaey could do what it 
wanted to so long as he nhad Sberman Adams in his pocket. n20 This conver-
sation supposedly took place about July 5, 1955. 21 Adams made no attempt 
to answer this charge, but Fox had so discredited himself in the eyes of the 
press that no defense was needed. 22 , The Fox testimony did mre damage to 
the Harris Committee by raising the question of its responsibility than it 
did to the Governor r s reputation. 
30 
The man around whose financial deaJ.ings the case centered took the 
stand at the hearings for the first time on July 2. 23 Goldfine e;,q>lained 
that he had received gifts from Governor Adams as well as giving them to 
him. He listed a billfold, a Swiss music box, a clock as a wedding present 
£or his son, Solomon, a painting, and a gold watch as items Adams had 
given him. 24 He described Fox as ua sick man, n25 and clai.med he had never 
asked Adams to help him in his cases before the FTC and SEC. 26 The in-
dustrialist admitted he had asked his friend to make an appointment for 
him with FTC Chairman Howrey, but added that he did not tell Adams his 
specific problem with the Commission. 27 The telephone call made to the 
President's Assistant after the conference with Ho~ resulted £rom the 
industrialist's enthusiasm with the outcome of the meeting, and was not 
intended to impress federal officials. 28 Of his troubles with the SEC, 
Goldfine said that he learned in November, 1955 that the East Boston Company 
had been fined $20,000 for contempt. 29 He had mentioned to Adams that the 
0oD¥>any was being persecuted by t1:e SEC, but he did not know anything about 
Ad.q.mS 1 actions after that. 30 In March, 1956, the SEC had agreed to drop 
the unenforceable fine it had imposed and the Company settled the problem 
with the Commission with East Boston paying $3,000 to cover the expenses 
o£ the case .31 
Returning on July 3, Goldfine presented his philosophy of friendship and 
gift giving, saying that he regretted embarrassing his friends, but that he 
did not lmow it was wrong to have friends among political leaders and to be 
generous. 32 This was the only e~lanation the textile manufacturer offered 
for his presents to the Assistant to the President. He claimed that he 
had bought the Oriental rug to use in his showroom and that he bad 100rely 
loaned it to Adams. 33 The witness also admitted that his company had deducted 
the hotel bills paid for Adams from its income tax report, but he said 
that if this did not comply with the law, he could adjust the reports.r4 
This admission was important to the subcommittee because it seemed to 
indicate that Goldfine considered his hospitality to Adams a business 
expense, a charge which he had denied. 
The gift- giving of the Boston manufacturer extended to far more 
people than the Assistant to the President. Committee Counsel Lishman 
produced a list of thirty-three government employees to whom GOldfine 
had given Christmas presents as large as $100.35 This, too, was evidence 
to the investigating group of Goldfine 1 s attempts to 11buy11 official favors. 
The attention of the investigators then turned to some $776,000 
in certified and bank treasurer 1 s checks purchased by Goldfine from 1941 
on. 36 These checks had not been cashed, and Lishman offered a hypothesis 
for which he had no proof that they might have been paid to government 
officials who could not risk cashing them for fear of jeopardizing their 
pcsitions, but who could utilize them for security in their business 
ventures. 37 The Congressmen asked Goldfine to reappear to explain the 
disposition of these checks. ·He agreed to try, but indicated that he 
was not sure he would be able to comply with these requests. 38 
During the time Goldfine was testifying, Senator M:>rse again blasted 
the Republicans. This time he levelled his critic ism directly at the 
President, blaming Eisenhower for not firing Adams earlier. 39 He read 
an editorial by Joseph Alsop in the vlashington Post of July 2, in which 
the columnist said that the President himself 1-1as the on:cy person who cotd.d 
have rallied Republican leaders to the support of his 4-ssistant, and he 
had not attempted to do so. 40 In essence, Adams had the duty of deciding 
Mil own future. 41 Despite Eisenhower 1 s devotion to Adams, which Alsop 
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attributed to gratitude for the ability with which Adams had served the 
President during his illnesses, Alsop maintained that the matter should 
be settled one way or the other. 42 J.~rse left no doubt in any-body 1 s 
mind as to his opinion of the proper disposition of the affair. 43 
About this time, the President seemed to show signs of retreat from 
his previous firm stand in support of Adams. At a news conference, a 
reporter asked him if he had changed his mind at all about Adams as a 
result of Republican demands for his resignation. 44 Said the President, 
11The statement I made ••• I think about two weeks ago, is no more and no 
less an expl!esaion of my convictions at that time. n45 This left room 
for speculation that Eisenhower was beginning to waver, and that his 
opinion on July 2 might be somewhat different from his Views two weeks 
previously. It seems unlikely, however, that this was the case. Hagerty 
conferred with the President and then released a statement to the effect 
that Eisenhower still thought as he had when he made his first defense 
of Adams. 46 In light of this fact, the Chief Executive's ambiguous 
declaration appears to have been more a verbal slip than a sign of a 
lapse in his support for his Aide. 
Before its next scheduled hearing, the subcommittee, which had al-
rea.co/ been accused of irres}?onsibility in its handling of the Fox testimoey, 
faced another difficulty. On July 7 Goldfine's aides discovered Baron 
Shacklette, Chief Investigator for the body, listening to conversations 
in the industrialist's suite b,r means of a microphone under the door.47 
The Harris Committee called Shacklette before it to discuss the episode. 
The group condemned his behavior and the investigator resigned.48 Thus 
the Committee apparently repudiated the u.ntair tactics of its sleuth, but 
it was also suggested that Shacklette was an able investigator who would 
33 
no~ have atte:apted such an unethical practice without at least the tacit consent 
.49 
of Oren Harris. This viewpoint is unsubstantiated, but there was at least 
a question about the natives of the subcommittee in this cas.$. 
50 
Goldf;Lne resumed his testimony on July 9, saying that he paid 
hotel bills of about $90 for Adams at the Waldorf-Astoria. in 1954 while his 
51 
firm had a case pending before the FTC. Lishman tried to relate the 
settlement of the FTC case to the Adams-Goldfine meeting, but the manufacturer 
52 
claimed there was no connection. Goldfine also denied Lishman's accusation 
that he had been encouraged to try further violations of the ·aool Laoeling 
53 
Act after Adams had successfully intervened in one case. He steadfastly 
maintained, just as Ad2.llls had, that his friendship for Adams was a personal 
rather than a business affair. 
In the da.ys that followed, most of the testimony centered around 
Goldfine's financial dealingso He adraitted paying hotel bills for Senc:.tor 
Frederick Payne (R.-Me.);4 Senator Norris Cotton (R.~N.H.):5 . and 
56 
Senator Styles Bridges (R.N.H.) over a period of time fron 1956 to 1958.57 
He called Fox's charges tlw.t he had bought Adams a house and stocks and that 
Adams had promised to help him 11 a contemptible lie. 1158 After conferring 
with Llildred Paperman, his secretary, he testified that the gifts he gave 
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Adams had been treated as expenses for tax purposes. 
Goildfine refused to cooperate with the Congressmen YThen they questioned 
him about the disposition of the checks. He failed to account for several 
checks which had a total value of about ~?89,000, and refused to answer questions 
concerning these, contending that the inquiries were irrelevant to the investi-
60 gation. Although nothing could be proved, Goldfine's conduct in relation 
to the checks left many with the feeling that he was hiding something, 
perhaps even shielding Ad9..t'TIS. Representative Peter F. Mack, Jr. 
tD - nl.), 61 a member of the committee, summed up this feeling by telling 
Goldfine that he had let his friend Sherman· Adams down by not answering 
the questions asked him. 62 Goldfine 1 s actions, said Mack, :implied that 
he was not willing to jeopardize his own reputation to protect anyone, 
including Adams. 63 This statement gives insight into the importance at-
tached to the industrialist 1 s affairs, regardless of their relationship 
to the President's Assistant. 
During and a.!ter the Goldfine testimony, many publications turned 
their attention to some of the c· .. · \. ·- facets of the Adams case. Although 
some editors continued to call the subcommittee irresponsible for hear-
ing Fox Is testimony publicly, 64 others pointed out that closed hearings 
lend themselves to the spread of rumors. 65 Pleas arose for more ex-
plicit ethical standards to guide officials,66 but other writers assert-
ed that the problem of gifts had been blown out of proportion and that 
gift giving to public officials should be seen as a human problem unrela-
ted to party affiliation. 67 
In the study of issues, Adams himself was not forgotten. Some maga-
zines still assumed he would ultimately leave the government. 68 One 
theory offered to explain the ~ssistant 1 s conduct was that he had original-
ly been elected to the New Hampshire legislature to represent business 
interests and had carried this practice over to national politics, where 
it was less acceptable.69 Why Adams failed to realize that his standards 
had to adjust to his new situation when others made the change remained 
unexplained. 70 The press studied the case from all angles, giving it 
little chance to die quietly. 
Congressmen again joined in the outcry. Senator Morse once mre 
criticized Adams' behavior. 71 In the House, John Dingell, {D - Mich.), 72 
placed in the Record statements which had appeared in newspapers by Re-
publican Senators, state chairmen and candidates, indicating a desire 
:bo have Adams out of the government. 73 These condemnations came from 
every section of the country except the deep South, 74 where Republican-
ism was too weak to be a force. This action on the part of Dingell 
illustrates the double use of the news media made by outspoken Congress-
... 
men. They gave their statements to the press in order to influence the 
subscribers to the newspapers, then entered the articles in the Congres-
sional Record to focus national attention on the problem and their po-
sition. This union of the channels of public information with the parti-
san politicians as.sured that;.the case would be kept before the people 
and that the Assistant to the President would have no relief from the 
harassing of his critics. 
Chapter VI 
The Case: Conclusion and Aftermath 
The summer of 1958 continued to be a crucial period for both Adams 
and Goldfine. For the industrialist, his testi3ony concerning his friend-
s4ip rr.hth Adams was only the beginning of a series of problems. Because 
of his failure to answer the questions about the checks, he was cited 
for conteiTq?t of' Congress.1 This action brought with it a one year fiail 
term, which was suspended, and a $1,000 fine. 2 In 1960, the businessman 
served a three month jail term for concealing income tax information, 
and a year later a federal court found him guilty of $790,000 in income 
tax evasion and sentenced him to serve a year and a day in prison.3 
Tne final setback of his career came men, in 1:t62, with $10,300,000 in 
tax claims against him, the former millionaire lost his property and 
industries. 4 When he died in September, 1967,5 Goldfine was a poor nan, 
remembered as the person •mose shady business deals led to tba political 
dotmi'all of Shennan Adams. 
Adams, whose friendship with Goldfine had turned into a nightmare, 
remained on the job through the summer of' 1958. The Assistant to the 
President, who had become virtually irreplaceable after designing the 
administrative structure that ran the government while Eisenhower was 
ill,6 lost prestige. No longer did Adams make business calls to and receive 
them from Capitol Hill. 7 Meanwhile, his staff members sought graceful 
·ways to ease his inevitable departure, and frantic Republicans who faced 
the ~sgect pf defeat at the polls because of associaJ.iion with Adams 
received assurances from unidentifiable sources that the Aide would be 
out before the November election. 8 
The Republican state chairmen had shmm themselves to be cool to 
Adams in late June vmen, in one poll, thirteen called for his ouster, 
twelve said his resignation was not needed, and seventeen offered no 
opinion. 9 .The balance at that time rested in the hands of those who had 
not made up their minds on the issue. These seventeen men obviously 
would offer Adams· no strong support. Vice President Nixon had rallied 
to the cause of the executive, asking Republican leaders not to act like 
"cannibals" in their treatment of a man vmo was experiencing difficulty.10 
The Adana case quickened a trend of non-identification with the ad-
ministration in the Republican party. 11 The candidates for office in 1958 
showed a tendency to run on their own merits or to debate local issues 
rather than to point to the man in Washington as 11their man. 1112 The 
conservative element, against which Adcms had battled since his term in 
Congress, gained strength in the state organizations •13 In essence, the 
indiscretion of the Assistant to the President had sharpened the differences 
between the factions within his party. 
The tension increased as the SWiliiBr progressed. On August 20, Nixon 
informd Eisenhower that Adams 1 presence in the White House handicapped 
Republican office seekers, and that most of them were prepared to take 
a public stand against him.l4 About the same tine, the President received 
a report from New England to the effect that Goldfine's business actiVities 
were questionable and that Adams had shown poor judgment in his associa-
tion with the man.15 Meade Alcorn, Republican National Chairman, rein-
forced the Vice President • s assertion and added that some Republic an 
contributors md refused to donate funds to the campaign mile Adams 
retained his position.16 In addition, the Republican Congressional 
Campaign Committee Chairmen were threatening an open statement against 
the President's Aide. 17 
The President, l-Tho had not asked for Adams' resignation because he 
believed in his assistant's integrity,18 asked Alcorn to poll the delegates 
at the meeting of the Republican National Committee in Chicago on August 
26 and 27 to find out their feelings on Adams • retention.19 The national 
party head reported to the President that these people were unanimous 
in a belief' that the Governor should leave office. 20 
Eisenhower, distressed and angered by the Republicans' "hopelessness" 
because of' the investigation's revelations, realized on September 4, after 
a conference with Alcorn, that Adams would ult:i.nBtely have to go. 21 
Nevertheless, definite action was delayed until after the 1-!ai.ne election 
of' September 8 at the request of' Senator Frederick Payne, who sought 
reelection. 22 P~e had received gifts from Goldfine, and he felt that 
his chance of victory at the polls would be greatly reduced if' Adams was 
fired be~ause of' his association with the industrialist.23 The election 
results represent~d final disaster for Adams. Not onlY was P~e defeated, 
but the Democrats won the Governorship and two seats in Congress. 24 
Immediately, Republican Senators Ed Thye of' Minnesota and .Arthur Watkins 
of Utah, who were fighting for their offices against difficult opposition, 
contacted Meade Alcorn and insisted upon Adams• dismissal. 25 
On September 16' at Eisenhower Is request, 26 Nixon and Alcorn visited 
Adams, who had been called back from a vacation, and told him that the 
party would suffer if' he did not resign. 27 Although soxoo 1riters contend 
otherwise, 28 they did not ask him to leave the government, 29 but presented 
the facts to him. 30 At this time, the President was confident that his 
assistant would decide to resign, and he felt this was best.3~ Ad~s had lost 
the support of his chief, and this made it virtually impossible for him to 
retain his position. 
Confronted w1 th this situation) Adams sent Gerald Morgan to Ne-wport 
where the President was st~ng to find out Eisenhoser's point of view 
firsthand. 32 When the White House Counsel confirmed Alcorn's version, 
Adams drafted his resignation and gave it to the President.33 At the in-
sistence of his wife that he give his account of the events which caused 
his resignation, 34 Adams appeared on teleVision on September 22 to malta 
a public statement. 35 The departing executive told the nation that 
he had been vindicated by every responsiblB witness at the hearing, and 
that he had been harmed by the wild, unsubstantiated testimony to which 
the subcommittee had listened. 36 Declaring himself the Victim of a cam-
paign to embarrass the President, he stated that he was resigning to avoid 
hindering Eisenhower 1 s program and hurting his party in the Congressional 
election. 37 vlith this, one who had served the President for six years 
departed from the Washington scene. 
The President accepted Adams' resignation with sadness, praising him 
for his service to the goverrunent and reaffirming his faith in him. 38 Nixon 
and Alcorn expressed their sorrow and regret at the loss to the government 
of Adams' services.39 The men Who had forced his resignation for political 
reasons felt that personally and administratively, the Governor had been 
a worthy asset to the White House staff. The newspapers and magazines 
reiterated their previous positions that Adams had acted with extremely 
poor judgment in his association with Bernard Goldfire 1 40 and that tale 
President had mown weakness in his failure to take action on moral grounds. 4l 
Adams t resignation was the culmination of a series of events. He 
himself had supplied the excuse for the attack in his ill-advised friend-
ship with Bernard Goldfine, and the politicians had seized the opportunity 




The 1958 case had consequences both immediate and long-range in scope. 
Adams 1 rompartmentalization of the various facets of his life put an end 
to his career of public service and prominence. Although morally inno-
cent, the Assistant to the President had regarded his personal affairs 
and his political office as separate, not realizing that to others a 
connection l·Tould be apparent. His blind spot was his failure to realize 
that in the American political scheme, all phases of the high official 1s 
life are public property and appearances are as important as reality. 
Innacurate estimates of the character of individuals and inability to 
sense the people 1s reaction to circumstances were, in the case of Sherman 
Adams, as damaging as grossly unethical behavior \·muld have been. 
Tm disagreement as to whether Adams resigned or was fired as a 
result of the Goldfine case is one of words rather than of events. He 
decided to leave his position only after the President had indicated that 
that would be the best course of action. Since Eisenhower virtually 
forced tre resignation, Adams was spared only the public embarz:a.ssment 
of dismissal. 
During and after the Adams case, public attention turned to the prin-
ciple of political ethics. In JulJj the Senate, disturbed by the diffi-
culties of the Assistant to the President, quickly passed a bill which 
the House had approved the previous August. 1 a This prohibited officials 
from accepting any gift that could be construed as conflict of interest, 
from making private commitments concerning their public duties, and from 
using confidential information for their own ends. 2 This bill, although 
general rather :bhan specific in its form,_.dealt w.i.th the issues which 
had confronted Eisenhower 1 s~ide and showed the desire of Congress to deal 
with an area of public affairs which had been both ambiguous and treacherous. 
The events from June through September of 1958 illustrate the com-
pleoc function of one of the most powerful forces on the modern poll tical: 
scene, the press. In their dual role of reporter of events and maker of 
p1;1bll:ic opinion, the news media influence millions daily. Through constant 
coverag~of the developments~;in the hearings, they underscored the importance 
of the Adams case. Attempts at glossing over the affair could not avail 
because the people knew what had happened. 
Perhaps moreprucial than the diffusion of the facts was thee ditorial 
polidy of . the newspapers and magazines. By their comments, the publica-
tions actually made public opinion. 'I'through their insistence on Adams 1 
resignation, their polls showing that politicians favored his ouster, and 
their statements that his departure was a foregone conclusion, these 
organs created a sense of indignation in the people and a desire to see 
Adams out of vlashington. This sentiment expressed itself in the Maine 
election and d1dndling financial support of the Republican party. Fina.Jlr, 
the President's Aosistant 1s decision to appear on television to explain 
his reasons f::Dr resigning indicates his realization that the country as 
a whole J:a.d reacted to his actions, and that he uould have to use the 
communications media to giw them his version of the incident. 
Thus, the fall of Shennan Adams resulted from a coalition of powerfUl 
falt-ces. The of;f'icial made a mistake which the Democrats stressed in 
committee and to which the Republican politicians reacted vigorously. 
The press, in combining relation of the facts and the politicians' views 
and adding the opinions of the editors, brought the case to a showdown. 
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Adams, Sherman, Firsthand Report; the Story of the Eisenhower Administra-
tion._!'!•Y• 1 1961. _ 
This work gives Adams 1 own account of his part in the Eisenhower 
caropaign and administration, as well as a description of the events 
surrounding his resignation. Writing in 1961 1 the author had the 
advantage of hindsight, and he was naturally biased by his political 
ideas~:~yet the book was aninvaluable record of the central character Is 
feelings about the Adams case. 
Eisenhower, Dwight DaVid, Mandate for Chenge, 1953-1956; the White House 
Years. Garden City, N.Y., 1963. 
Eisenhower's description of the organization of his staff and of 
the place of Sherman Adams in the government, as well as his discussion 
of his feelings about his aide, ~§3 insight into the reason for the 
Chief Executive 1 s hesitation to dismiss his assistant. 9?,j . '1.:1-
.F 3 6 ,..,__~ 
Eisenhower, Dwight D., Public Papers of the Presidents of the United 
States. January 1- December 31 1 1958. \'Jashington, 1959. 
This was 
1-J:Qrci~, :1=9, ~l{~ 
.. . . ' . . ' ·' 
a valuable record of Eisenhower's reactions, in his own 
A<ia.ms. ~9-~EhilLt the time it happened. 3 6~ -5. Q3 
u r; r .,:c-u.--
Eisenhower, Dwight David, Waging Peace, 1956-1961; the White House Years. 
Garden City, N.Y., 1965. 
The President 1 s sentiments about Adams I resignation and his dislike 
for politics manifest themselves in this memoir. 
Gevernment Documents 
Biograp\iical Directory of the American Conw::ess 1774-1961. House Doc., 
85 Gong., 2 sess. 
Con~essionaJ. Record, 84 Gong., 1 sese ( 1955)J C!j ··~as ;C9ng., 2 :sess. 
{19 ), CIV. 
The Record reflected the reactions of the Congressmen to Dixon -
Yates and to the case of 1958. These reactions, especially those in 
the latter year, proved to be a vital factor in the end of Adams 1 career. 
Investigation of Regu1atoEY Commissions and Agenci~s •. Hearings Before 
a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and ~ore~ n Commerce. 
House of Representatives, 5 Gong., 2 seas. an.-July, 19 ' parts 
1, 2, .>--12. 
The government document, in relating the entire h:aring and giving 
in full the testimony of key witnesses, formed the bas~c framework for 
my description of the Adams case. 
Secondary Sources 
@ Donovan, Robert J., Eisenhower: the Inside Stacy. N.Y., 1956. 9 7:3,9 .2... 
- Db~ 
9~~ Hughes, Emmet Jolm1 The Ordeal of Power; A Political Memoir of the 
Eisenhower Years. N.Y., 1963. _ '17:3. 9 ~ 
./ J..l ?? 1Q~ Schwartz, Bernard, The Professor and the Commissions. N.Y., 1959. 
Although definitely biased by his anger with the subcommittee 
which fired him, Schwartz explained some of the decisions made by the 
body in executive session and supplied information not available 
elsewhere. 35 3, o 9 
s 97 
Periodicals 
1~. Business Week~ June, 1958. 
The editorials in thi:srnmagazine gave the viewpoint of the business 
world on the Adams case. This interpretation was particular]¥ vital 
to an understanding of reactions to the hearings, because both Adams 
and Goldfine bad business connections. 
12. The Commonweal, LXVIII;LXIX. 
rg. Current BiographX:, November, 1952. 
This factual account of Adams 1 life up to the time of his appoint-
ment as Assistant to the President in 1952 helped to fill in the gaps 
left by other sources in the ear]¥ career of Eisenhovrer 1 assistant. 
14. ~' XLIV-XLV. 
1S. The Nation, CLXXXVI. 
16. The New Republic, CXXXVIII-CXXXIX. 
19. The New York Times, 1952, 1958. 
20. 
21. 
Although the Times vras mainly a secondary source, it provided the 
only prirnary account of the resignation speech of Sherman Adams. 
The New Yorker, XXXIV. 
Newsweek, LI-LII. 
The reporting of this magazine was accurate for the most part, 
and the publication served as a valuable background source. 
The Reporter, XIX. 
u.s. News and \vorld Report, XLIII-XLV • ~of(\q, 
The excellent factual coverage of this magazine condensedt\of the 
major points of the hearing, and provided a background for thE! study 
of the documents themselves. u.s. News was a fruitful starting point 
for mlf research. 
